The Antitrust Laws in Foregin Commerce by Nitschke, Robert A.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 8 
1955 
The Antitrust Laws in Foregin Commerce 
Robert A. Nitschke 
Member, Michigan Bar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Commercial Law Commons, International Trade 
Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Legal Writing and 
Research Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert A. Nitschke, The Antitrust Laws in Foregin Commerce, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1059 (1955). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss8/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1955] A.NrrrR.usT LAws IN FoREIGN COMMERCE 1059 
THE ANTITRUST LAWS IN FOREIGN COMMERCE 
Robert A. Nitschke* 
THE Sherman Act applies to trade or commerce "with foreign na-tions."1 Are there differences in the act's application to foreign 
trade compared with its application to domestic commerce? The At-
torney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws was 
constituted at a time when this question was pressing for an answer. 
During the 1920's and 1930's, the international cartel movement 
was in full Hood. American companies participated in some of these 
international arrangements, often in the belief that they were a nec-
essary condition for world trade and upon the legal premise that 
restrictions adjunctive to patent and know-how licenses were lawful. 
During the 1940' s, a barrage of antitrust cases struck at these agree-
ments.2 Cartels were criticized as economically and politically harmful.8 
Out of these many cases grew certain special problems which had 
not appeared in tp.e cases involving domestic restraints. One was the 
problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction. How far over foreign persons 
and conduct could the arm of antitrust reach? Secondly, did the 
difficulties of foreign trade in the modern world warrant a different 
test of Sherman Act liability? Should consideration be given to the 
impossibility of doing business in certain countries due to exchange 
and tariff restrictions? Were restrictions ancillary to patent, know-how 
and trade-mark licenses necessary and permissible? Could a parent 
conduct its foreign business lawfully through foreign subsidiaries? 
What joint foreign activities with competitors would be permissible? 
Thirdly, how could antitrust policy be coordinated with the require-
ments of the cold war? And, lastly,4 should the United States partici-
~ Member, Michigan Bar.-Ed. 
126 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§ 1, 2. 
2 CCH, THE Fm>ERAL ANrrrnusT LAws (1952) See also cases cited in Carlston, 
"Antitrust Policy Abroad," 49 N. W. Umv. L. REv. 569 (1954), and Hale and Hale, 
"Monopoly Abroad: The Antitrust Laws and Commerce in Foreign Areas," 31 TEX. L. 
REv. 493 (1953). 
8 For a bibliography on cartels, extraterritorial application of United States antitrust 
laws, etc., see ABA Section on Antitrust Law, Proceedings at the Spring Meeting, Wash-
ington, D. C., April 1 and 2, 1954, p. 225 et seq. 
4 One minor problem was the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 40 Stat. L. 517, 15 
U.S.C. (1952) §§62, 63, 65, permitting certain restrictive activities by export associations. 
The committee took the view that, although the act is not much used, it does help some 
small businesses to compete against combinations authorized under foreign law, and, more-
over, previous abuses have been corrected by United States v. United States Alkali Export 
Assn., Inc., (D.C.N.Y. 1949) 86 F. Supp. 59, and United States v. Minnesota Mining & 
Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 947. A minority dissent took the view that it 
represented an exemption contrary to the philosophy of the Sherman Act and should be 
repealed. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMITTEE TO STUDY THE 
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pate in the United Nations proposal for international control of 
restrictive business practices? Coupled with the strong public con-
viction that cartels were bad was the growing apprehension that un-
certainties in the application of antitrust to foreign trade might be 
retarding business enterprise and investment abroad and hindering 
cold war objectives at a time when the United States was assuming 
leadership in the free world.5 It was most timely, therefore, to have 
these issues examined by a committee composed of outstanding authori-
ties in the antitrust field, reflecting all shades of liberal and conserva-
tive points of view. 
In its Report, the committee rejects, at the outset, any proposal 
for general exemptions of foreign commerce from the antitrust laws 
or for substantial revision to define specific legal and illegal ~onduct 
in foreign trade transactions. 6 The committee states its belief that the 
generality of the Sherman Act provides the necessary Hexibility for 
its adaptation to any problems peculiar to foreign trade. With these 
principles as a guide, the committee proceeds to deal with each of the 
particular problems which has come to the fore in connection with 
antitrust and foreign trade. 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
The recent investigatory and enforcement activities against cartels 
have had an impact upon foreign nationals and indeed upon inter-
national relations, raising serious questions as to the extent to which 
the United States should attempt to enforce antitrust consequences 
upon persons or conduct outside of its territorial jurisdiction.7 
.ANnTRoS'r LAws, March 31, 1955, -pp. 109-114 (hereinafter referred to as Ri!POR"r, fol-
lowed by the page number). 
5 United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Bureau, FAcroRs LIM-
ITING UNITED STATES !Nv:EsTMEN'I' ABROAD, Part 2, p. 32 (1954); ABA Section on 
International and Comparative Law, RllPORT OF THE CoMMITI'EE ON OOERNATIONAL 
TRADE RllcoLATION, "Impact of Antitrust Laws on Foreign Trade," Aug. 6, 1953; "Study 
of the Financial Aspects of International Trade and of the Export-Import Bank and World 
Bank," RllPoRT OF THE CrnzEN's ADVISORY CoMMITI'EE To THE CoMMITTEE ON BANK-
ING AND CURRENCY pursuant to S. Res. 25 and S. Res. 183, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 19 
(1954); President's Message to Congress, March 30, 1954, N.Y. T1MEs, March 31, 1954, 
p. 18:1. 
6 RllPORT 66. 
1 E.g., in United States v. National Lead Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 513, 
affd. 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947), the court cancelled contracts made abroad 
which prohibited sales by American concerns in certain European countries. The European 
parties at one time threatened suit against the American firms for breach of these contracts 
claiming they had invested capital in their businesses on the assumption they would be 
free from competition from the American concerns. 
In the Newsprint investigation, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed 
to Canadian International Paper Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 1013, subpoenas duces 
tecum for documents located in Canada, issued against Canadian subsidiaries of American 
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After analyzing all of the important cases8 in the £.eld, the com-
mittee concludes that the Sherman Act should be applied in foreign 
commerce with due regard for its effect on another nation's sovereignty 
or the customary comity between nations. The committee adds, how-
ever, that it is not improper to impose liabilities, even upon foreign 
nationals, for conduct outside the United States that has intentional 
consequences within the United States which United States laws 
forbid. Consequently, two standards are adopted: 
l. Insofar as arrangements between American £.rms alone or 
acting in concert with foreign £.rms are concerned, the Sherman 
Act applies not only to conduct in the United States but also to 
acts performed abroad with sufficiently substantial anticompeti-
tive effects on our trade and commerce as to constitute unreason-
able restraints.9 
2. Insofar as arrangements between foreig!} competitors alone 
are concerned, the Sherman Act should ap_ply only where they 
are intended to and actually do result in substantial anticompeti-
tive effects on our foreign commerce.10 
firms found to be doing business in the United States, stirred up such adverse public 
opinion that a provincial statute was enacted prohibiting removal of business records from 
Canada without legislative approval. The Business Records Protection Act, 1 Ont. Rev. 
Stat., c. 44 (1950). 
In the Oil investigation, upon the intervention of a foreign government, grand jmy 
subpoenas were quashed against a foreign corporation in which the foreign government 
had a substantial interest. In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the 
Production, Transportation, Refining and Distribution of Petroleum, (D.C.D.C. 1952) 
13 F.R.D. 280. 
In United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., (D.C.N.Y. 1951) 100 
F. Supp. 504, decree granted (D.C.N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215, the court ordered I.C.I., 
a British company, to reassign certain patents to the American party so as to preclude those 
patents from being used to prevent exports by the American party into Great Britain. 
I.C.I. had in the meantime granted an exclusive license to a second British company. This 
second British company, suing in English courts, secured an injunction preventing I.C.I. 
from complying with that part of the American decree. The British court held that it 
would grant performance as against interference by the courts of another land of a lawful 
English contract made between English nationals and to be performed in England. Brit-
ish Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 2 All E. R. 780 (1952); 
British Nylon Spinners v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 3 All E. R. 88 (1954). 
8 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (19II); 
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 47 S.Ct. 592 (1927); United States v. 
Pacific & Arctic Railway and Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 33 S.Ct. 443 (1913); United 
States v. National Lead Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 513, affd. 332 U.S. 319, 
67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., (D.C. Ohio 1949) 
83 F. Supp. 284, affd. 341 U.S. 593, 71 S.Ct. 971 (1951); United States v. General 
Electric Co., (D.C.N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753; United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416; United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 
(D.C.N.Y. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 504, decree granted (D.C.N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215. 
9 REPORT 76. See United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., (D.C. Ohio 1949) 83 
F. Supp. 284, affd. 341 U.S. 593, 71 S.Ct. 971 (1951); United States v. National Lead 
Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 513. 
10 REPORT 76; United States v. Aluminum Company of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 
148 F. (2d) 416. Neither of these standards apparently deals with "potential" restraints 
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The committee recommends that where a foreign party attempts 
to enforce abroad against an American party a contract declared illegal 
under the Sherman Act, the State Department or other appropriate 
federal agency should endeavor to protect the American party. With 
respect to foreign nationals, decrees should include a provision that 
the judgment shall not operate as against any action taken in com-
pliance with the laws of a foreign government to which the defendant 
is subject.11 Conversely, the committee recommends that an American 
company should not be held liable for participating in arrangements 
in another country (otherwise illegal under the Sherman Act) which 
are required by the laws of that country.12 
Different Reasonableness Test for Foreign Trade 
In its discussion of the Sherman Act generally, the Report con-
cludes that divisions of markets, or agreements not to compete in 
specified territories, are to be treated as conclusively unreasonable.13 
While recognizing that the same standards of reasonableness apply to 
foreign and domestic commerce alike,14 the committee adopts as its 
view the statement of Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in the Timken 
case that "circumstances of foreign trade may alter the incidence of 
what in the setting of domestic commerce would be a clear case of 
unreasonable restraint."15 Thus, the Report says that evidence may 
be offered to show that, even without any specific agreement not to 
export from the United States, export to a particular area was virtually 
impossible because of tariffs, import controls, dollar shortages, etc.16 
The usual argument against "impossibility" as a justification for 
restraints has been that if there is no possibility of trade, why is it 
necessary for the parties to agree not to trade? Furthermore, foreign 
or restraints "in their incipiency," but it would seem doubtful that the committee intended 
to approve agreements which would necessarily result in the prescribed anticompetitive 
effects. Nor do the standards distinguish between civil and criminal suits, although the 
latter have certainly much less application to foreign nationals and foreign conduct. 
11 REPORT 76; United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C.N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 
753; British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 2 All E. R. 780 
(1952). 
12 REPORT 83. The Report refers to "price-fixing solely in that country." This could 
hardly have the requisite effect on our foreign commerce. The doctrine would seem more 
reasonably to apply to foreign quota restrictions on exports or imports. 
13 See REPORT 26, dealing with domestic restraints and citing cartel cases. 
14 The committtee supports the view that foreign commerce should include, "as 
in domestic commerce," capital investment, financing, property rights in patents, trade-
marks, trade secrets and know-how. REPORT 80. 
15Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 at 605, 71 S.Ct. 971 
(1951). 
16 REPORT 83. This does not mean it is enough merely to show that the arrangement 
was a more profitable way of doing business. 
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trade conditions change, and consonant with the rejection of economic 
justification for price fixing in the Trenton Potteries case, the govern-
ment should not have the burden of "ascertaining from day to day 
whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of 
economic conditions."17 Another argument-paralleling the "strict con-
struction" rule given to exemptions under the Sherman Act, which 
rule holds illegal anticompetitive conduct in any area not clearly regu-
lated by statutory exemption18-is that when foreign trade conditions 
make difficult enough what little trade is left, there is all the more 
reason for not allowing that small amount to be shut off by private 
restraints. 
The Report, however, does not say that "impossibility" by itself 
justifies restraints in foreign trade.19 It says, rather, that "impossibility" 
is merely a basis for demonstrating that the restrictive conduct was a 
prerequisite for trade. The Report again quotes Justice Frankfurter's 
opinion in Timken: 
'When as a matter of cold fact the legal, financial and govern-
mental policies deny opportunity for exportation from this coun-
try and importation into it, arrangements that afford such oppor-
tunities to American enterprise may not fall under a ban of a 
fair construction of the Sherman Law because comparable ar-
rangements regarding domestic commerce come within its con-
demnation."20 
The real test, therefore, is not impossibility alone, but whether or 
not the agreements produced more trade than they restrained. Such 
a test might not be permissible in domestic commerce where, pre-
sumably, Congress can control the area of desirable competition and 
freedom to trade, e.g., states cannot impose restrictions upon inter-
state shipments. 
But as a practical matter in foreign commerce, limited restraints 
can produce trade. For example, the importation of certain finished 
products from the United States may be virtually prohibited by im-
port controls and dollar shortages, but if these finished products are 
manufactured in the foreign country and contain a sufficiently high 
percentage of local content, th~ foreign government may .. permit the 
import by the local manufacturer of raw materials, semi-finished 
products and all the components and accessories of a higher technology 
17 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 at 396-398, 47 S.Ct. 377 
(1927). 
1s United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 60 S.Ct. 182 (1939). 
19 REPORT 83. 
20 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 at 605-606, 71 S.Ct. 
971 (1951). Italics added. 
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which pie foreign country is not capable of producing.21 Local manu-
facture can be undertaken only with American know-how, designs, 
drawings, technical assistance and perhaps license under foreign 
patents. The American manufacturer may not be willing to part with 
these and undertake to establish a potential competitor without secur-
ing a promise from the recipient not to sell in the United States or 
other territory covered by the American company.22 Similarly, the 
foreign licensee may be unwilling to undertake the manufacture of 
the finished product, involving capital investment in plant and ma-
chinery and long-term expenditures for sales promotion, if he cannot 
secure the promise from the American manufacturer not, in effect, 
to destroy what has been transferred by competing in the foreign 
manufacturer's area. Thus, such limited agreements not to compete 
in certain territories may create the opportunity for the only trade 
possible under the circumstances.23 
This principle also operates the other way. Foreign firms may 
have patents or know-how which American firms may desire to obtain 
and which could develop entire industries in the United States, some 
of them essential to our defense, and expand substantially the foreign 
trade of the United States. The American firms may be able to ac-
quire these patents and know-how only by agreeing not to compete 
with the foreign company in certain territories which the foreign com-
pany considers its natural areas. 
Such restraints would, of course, have to be re?sonably ancillary 
to a lawful main purpose. As the committee has stated more particu-
larly in connection with its discussion on patent licensing agreements 
and agreements transferring know-how, the agreements would have 
to be limited in scope to the products made possible by the know-how 
and be reasonably limited in time, or, if based on patents, be within 
the scope of the patent grant, limited in time, and otherwise conform 
21 Or the foreign government may permit mportation of certain items, such as bear· 
ings, only if there is first establishd locally the manufacture of standard sizes and types used 
in that country. Then it may permit importation of the balance of sizes and types, i.e., 
those used in quantities too small to warrant profitable local manufacture. 
22 " ••• we are constantly up against the question of whether there is any satisfac-
tory basis for an American company to furnish technical assistance and information to a 
foreign concern without exposing itself or other licensees to the risk of loss of their estab-
lished markets either at home or abroad. It is quite apparent that, if the answer is flatly 
negative, there is a very limited opportunity to increase the flow of technology to foreign 
countries through private channels." Letter from Foreign Operations Administration to 
the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, REPORT 96. 
23 "Out of such situations evolves a principle favoring transactions where the resource 
of patents or 'know-how' is used with the primary purpose of increasing the inflow and 
outflow of commerce and enhancing the well-being of the economies of the United States 
and friendly foreign countries." REPORT 86. 
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to the rules applicable generally to lawful patent licensing under the 
Sherman Act.24 
Such agreements could not be excuses for cartels or for general 
arrangements to divide markets or restrain international trade. Here, 
of course, lies the real problem for the businessman and his lawyer. 
What starts out as an ancillary restraint, lawful in purpose, almost in-
evitably becomes, with the passage of time and the effectuation of the 
agreements not to compete, a complex of activity very little different 
in its restrictive effect from a nonancillary agreement not to compete. 
The foreign licensee wants to continue to receive new developments 
and improvements. The American firm feels it should get the benefit 
of any improvements the foreign firm makes on the products or proc-
esses which it has transferred. The question of how new territorities 
shall be developed arises. In all of such transactions protection may 
be desired by both parties. How can the businessman be sure that, 
when scrutinized by the Department of Justice ten years later, his 
once valid agreement will not have become coated with all the in-
dicia of what is considered to be a general agreement not to compete 
in each other's markets-a conclusively unreasonable type of restraint?25 
The doctrine, therefore, permitting reasonable restraints in foreign 
trade is really not a doctrine which insulates international business 
from antitrust risks or which opens up foreign trade to business re-
straints. It is rather a doctrine in favor of a limited promotion of 
foreign trade under present world conditions and in the public interest. 
The status of the law, as interpreted by the committee, thus will 
permit restrictions which will yield increases in our foreign trade, 
but because of the inevitable risks of undertaking such restrictions 
under the Sherman Act, it can be expected that businessmen will not 
enter into such restrictions except in situations where other business 
24 It should be pointed out that restraints ancillary to patent grants would generally 
be too limited in scope to meet the practical needs of the situation. The patent-antitrust 
cases hold any restraints which extend the monopoly beyond the grant to be either illegal 
per se or unenforceable. Hence, what might be reasonable in the broader sense in con• 
nection with transfers of know-how might be illegal if tested under the laws with respect 
to patents. In general, however, securing patent licenses is a minor part of any such 
arrangements with foreign concerns. The foreign firms desire patent immunity to the 
extent it is necessary, but the important thing is to secure the know-how and technical 
assistance without which, despite patent immunity, they would be incapable of producing 
the goods. 
25 Compare the judicial reactions to the "ancillary restraint" defenses in United States 
v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., (D.C. Ohio 1949) 83 F. Supp 284, affd. 341 U.S. 593, 
71 S.Ct. 971 (1951); United States v. National Lead Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 
513, affd. 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947); United States v. General Electric Co., 
(D.C. N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753. 
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alternatives are not available and where, in fact, the business cannot 
be done without some such restrictive arrangements.26 
Parent-Subsidiary 
With respect to agreements between parent and subsidiary to 
divide markets or establish prices, or otherwise eliminate competition 
between the parent and subsidiary, the Report applies the same doc-
trine for foreign commerce as for domestic. The cases are interpreted 
as holding that concerted action solely between the parent and sub-
sidiary or subsidiaries, which restrains no trade of outsiders but solely 
that between the parent and its subsidiary, does not violate section 1.27 
The committee rejects any implication to the contrary which might 
be construed from some of Justice Jackson's dissenting language in 
the Timhn case.28 
The argument for this rule, especially as applied to foreign trade, 
is that in most cases business cannot be done abroad without separate 
incorporation and that it is unrealistic to require the parent and sub-
sidiary to compete when, if the parent were operating through plants 
located abroad, the same restriction on trade would be lawful. The 
Report defines a subsidiary as one which is wholly-owned or where 
minority foreign stockholders are not competitors but merely investors.29 
The committee appears to deal only with the problem of subsidi-
aries established abroad by American companies and not with those 
acquired. The Report does state that section 7 of the Clayton Act, as 
amended, would appear to cover mergers of American and foreign 
companies where there is the specified effect on commerce within the 
United States.30 Hence, the acquisition of a foreign subsidiary which 
had previously been engaged in exporting to the United States in 
competition with the parent, or where the parent had previously been 
engaged in exporting to the territory of the competitor, might provide 
the requisites for violation of section 7. The argument, of course, can 
be made that if a foreign company is a true subsidiary of an American 
26 In many fields of world trade today, restrictions may have no business validity. 
Agreements on territories cannot keep pace with changes in dollar availability, exchange 
and tariff restrictions, and the shifting currents of world trade. Nor do American firms 
in many low-cost, mass-production industries need protection in the American market 
against foreign competition. Compare the recommendation of the REPORT (p. 342) for 
antitrust as a justification for and objective of unilateral and negotiated tariff reductions. 
27 REPORT 33-34. 
2SREPORT 88-89. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 at 
606-607, 71 S.Ct. 971 (1951). The committee also rejects any implication in United 
States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 947, that mere 
investment abroad which results in a diminution of United States exports is an antitrust 
violation. 
29 REPORT 30, n. 106. 
so REPORT 65, n. 1. 
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corporation, there is no need for agreements in restraint of trade since 
the controlled operation of the subsidiary itself would provide against 
undesirable competition. 31 
In elaborating on its viewpoint that competition between parent 
and subsidiary should not be required, the committee points out that 
the result of the Timken case has been in fact to require competition 
between a parent and subsidiary, while at the same time the Supreme 
Court decision approved eventual acquisition of control over a com-
petitor found to be, for many years previously, engaged in illegal cartel 
agreements with the now American parent. The committee suggests 
that the proper remedy should have been the dissolution decreed by 
the lower court. 32 
Joint Activities Abroad 
The Report expresses the view that manufacturing or distribution 
activities carried on abroad jointly by American competitors33 alone, 
or combined with foreign competitors, should not be illegal per se 
since they may encourage trade by affording-means for sharing risks 
of sometimes hazardous foreign operations. Such joint activities should 
be deemed legal if, first, they involve no restrictions on American im-
ports or exports, and second, do not unreasonably restrain competition 
in the American domestic market. 34 
To meet these qualifications will prove a very difficult task for any 
joint manufacturing operation despite a desirable and legitimate pur-
pose. The activities of any joint manufacturing operation among com-
petitors will produce effects and results which will be difficult to dis-
tinguish from traditional objectionable cartel consequences. For ex-
ample, the amount of goods that the new joint subsidiary will produce 
in foreign markets and the consequent extent to which export from 
the United States by the American partners will be curtailed will 
ordinarily be decided by agreement among the partners since they 
would hardly be likely to invest capital abroad and continue to export 
competitively to that area in derogation of their investment. Also, to 
the extent certain goods are exported from the United States rather 
than manufactured abroad by the joint subsidiary (or exported by a 
31 Perhaps this would not be true where a strong minority interest existed since, with-
out agreements which could be turned to as evidence of the relationship, the parent might 
be accused of operating the subsidiary solely for the benefit of the parent and to the detri-
ment of the interest of minority stockholders. 
32 REPORT 36; United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., (D.C. Ohio 1949) 83 
F. Supp. 284. 
33 Joint manufacturing activities by noncompetitors would ordinarily create no anti-
trust problems. 
34 REPORT 90. 
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foreign partner), agreement between the parent companies will prob-
ably be required to determine how much each member will export 
and the selling prices, particularly if the joint subsidiary, as is usually 
the case, will handle the distribution of exported materials. Further-
more, since the purpose of such a joint manufacturing subsidiary is 
to get business abroad which would otherwise not be obtainable, and 
since it will inevitably be operating in competition with exports from 
nonmember 6.rms, it will be very difficult for such operations to be 
conducted without creating the appearance that they constitute an 
enterprise to eliminate and restrict competition.35 
It would seem that any jointly-owned manufacturing or distribut-
ing organization inherently involves some division of markets and 
price-fixing, and a division of markets and price-6.xing among com-
petitors is per se illegal. The committee really sidesteps this important 
issue. Yet such joint ventures are the basis for many foreign operations 
of American businesses.36 
Coordinating Cold War Activities 
Since strict antitrust enforcement may, at times, have damaging 
effects on the cold war activities of our government and on other 
aspects of its foreign policy, the committee recommends the extension 
of the Defense Production Act, 37 at least with respect to programs for 
preserving the supply of critical and strategic materials from abroad.38 
This act permits the President to request competitors to enter into 
voluntary agreements upon a 6.nding that the action is vital to the 
national defense. The agreements are subject to the approval of the 
attorney general and may involve activities which would otherwise be 
illegal under the Sherman Act.39 
The committee also recommends that the immunity under this 
act cover conduct for a designated period of time beyond the act's 
expiration where the needs of national defense require it and where 
no alternative method less restrictive on competition appears possible. 
Such agreements could be terminated by the President if no longer 
in the national interest.40 
35 Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 at 15, 65 S.Ct. 1416 (1945). 
36 Note the committee's lame treatment of United States v. Minnesota Mining & 
Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 947 at 962, 963 on this issue. REPORT 91. 
37 64 Stat. L. 798 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. (1952) §2061 et seq., as amended, 67 
Stat. L. 129 (1953), 50 U.S.C.A. App. (Cum. Supp. 1954) §2062 et seq. 
38 REPORT 109. 
39 REPORT 108. 
40 REPORT 109. 
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The Report also recommends advance discussion on projected anti-
trust proceedings by the Department of Justice with other affected 
government agencies where the proceedings may involve national 
defense or other government foreign programs. This is stated to be a 
continuation of existing procedures followed in certain cases where 
the Justice Department has consulted with the State and Defense 
Departments as well as the National Security Council.41 In addition 
to avoiding antitrust litigation in conllict with foreign policy, such 
procedures might enable the Justice Department to obtain additional 
facts regarding the substance of the charges. It might provide desirable 
information as to the form of the suit, the relief, and the timing of 
proceedings. 
One member comments that antitrust litigation, so modified or 
discontinued by means of executive consultation, would not result 
in protection against private damage suit for such conduct, thus nulli-
fying the effect of such executive action on foreign policy and penaliz-
ing conduct encouraged by the government.42 Only legislation could 
provide immunity against such private suits. Such deprivation of 
compensation for loss to private parties caused by otherwise illegal 
acts, it may be argued, requires executive proceedings which would 
guarantee that exemptions of restrictive conduct would be limited to 
what was strictly necessary in the national interest, would not be 
granted if alternative less restrictive means would achieve the results, 
would be limited in time, and would be subject to periodic review. 
Another member of the committee, while approving Executive ac-
tion in this area, expresses the view that Congress should define the 
exemption power and place as much as possible of the fact-finding and 
decision-rendering in "normal deliberative tribunals" as a safeguard 
against what he believes to be a tendency of the executive in the past 
unnecessarily to waive antitrust in favor of other considerations of 
national interest.43 
UN Proposal44 
The committee does not pass on the UN proposal for regulating 
international restrictive business practices. It maintains that the prob-
41 REPORT 97-98. 
42 REPORT 98. 
43 REPORT 293. 
44 See generally Carlston, "Antitrust Policy Abroad," 49 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 713 
at 723 (1955); Domke, "The United Nations Draft Convention on Restrictive Business 
Practices," 4 lNTr.. & CoMP. L. Q. 129 (1955); Edwards, "Regulation of Monopolistic 
Cartelization," 14 Omo ST. L. J. 252 (1953); .Edwards, "Inadequacy of National Regula-
tion of Cartels and Proposed Control by United Nations," 14 G.no. WASH. L. REv. 626 
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lem is primarily one of international relations rather than of antitrust 
policy.45 Nevertheless, the Report does contain two discussions of the 
proposal, one, a dissent from the committee's decision not to comment, 
which supports the UN's draft articles of agreement,46 and a rejoinder 
opposing the UN proposal.47 It would have been the better course, 
perhaps, for the majority to have examined the proposal or at least 
to have set forth its analysis of the problem, showing its relation to 
international relations rather than antitrust. 
The UN proposal cannot be viewed simply as a program for inter-
national, as distinguished from national, enforcement of antitrust 
policy. International law is founded upon mutual objectives and poli-
cies in :6.elds which extend outside the effective jurisdiction of any 
single country, e.g., maritime rules, regulation of narcotics and white-
slave traffic, etc. In the :6.eld of antitrust, however, there are few 
countries other than the United States which have any effective anti-
trust policies or enforcement programs. Moreover, there are nations 
in the UN whose policies are opposed to antitrust. Some countries, 
less devoted to private enterprise as an economic institution, may view 
antitrust as a means by which private enterprise can be discredited 
in the eyes of the public so as to facilitate nationalization. Such coun-
tries are unlikely to be interested in using antitrust to increase com-
petition among private :6.rms. The communist countries not only are 
disinterested in antitrust but are instead dedicated to destroying free 
enterprise throughout the world. They can be expected to exploit 
any UN program for political purposes against free enterprise and 
the capitalistic free world. It would seem, therefore, that these are 
problems as much for diplomats and our State Department experts as 
for antitrust lawyers and professors.48 Our idealism and enthusiasm 
for the achievements of antitrust in this country should not lead us 
into a program which could set back rather than further the cause of 
antitrust in the rest of the world. 
(1946); Kopper, "The International Regulation of Cartels-Current Proposals," 40 VA. 
L. REv. 1005 (1954); Lockwood and Schmeisser, "Restrictive Business Practices in Inter-
national Trade," II LAw & CoNT.llM. PROB. 663 (1946); Lubin, "U. S. Proposes U.N. 
Action on Cartels," 25 Dept. of State Bul. 590 (1951); Timberg, ''Restrictive Business 
Practices," 2 AM. J. CoMP. L. 445 (1953); REsTRICTIVE BusINEss PRACTICES, UNESCO 
Official Records, 16th Sess., Supp. 11, IIA and IIB (1953). 
45 In connection with the committee's views as to its qualifications for appraising the 
UN proposal, it should be noted that the government liaison groups attached to the com-
mittee did not include personnel from the Department of State. REPORT viii. 
46 REPORT 98-105. 
47 REPORT 105-108. 
48 The Attorney General's National Committee itself may be regarded as a good 
precedent for appointment by the President of a committee of qualified experts to evaluate 
and make recommendations regarding the UN proposal. 
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It would be unfortunate, nonetheless, if the United States should 
tum its back upon efforts to promote antitrust in the free world.49 
It is in our trading and political interest abroad to encourage the growth 
of antitrust philosophy as the key to a successful and expansionist pri· 
vate enterprise economy. For restrictive and nonexpansionist private 
enterprise is not likely to succeed in preserving the world's people 
from communism. The wide difference between public attitudes t~ 
ward business in the United States and in Europe stems from the 
expansionist philosophy of American business, nurtured by antitrust, 
with its resultant prosperous economy and high standard of livin& 
as compared with the nonexpansionist, market-dividing, restrictive 
theories of European business. 
Perhaps a better international cartel program, designed to promote 
antitrust objectives as well as to eliminate friction regarding extra· 
territorial application, would be step-by-step bilateral agreements with 
those nations, such as Canada, which have laws and policies similar 
to ours. Such agreements could establish procedures for dealing with 
restrictive practices that have an impact in both countries and can be 
dealt with satisfactorily by neither alone and could provide experience 
for further progress in this field. · 
Conclusion 
Considering the different shades of opm10n represented on the 
committee, the Foreign Trade Section of the Report is remarkable for 
the degree of unanimity attained. The conclusions and recommenda-
tions agreed upon constitute a consensus which cannot be cast aside 
or ignored. In an area vexed by confusion and extreme positions, the 
Report provides a foundation for the clarification and solution of anti-
trust problems in the foreign trade field.50 
The Report reminds us that, in a world of economic restriction 
and political tyranny, the United States remains the example par ex-
ellence throughout world history of a free enterprise system. We do 
not need to despoil the Sherman Act nor need we fear that business 
will be, in tum, despoiled by the act. Modifications of the statutory 
49 It should be noted that our antitrust enforcement against cartels has in itself de-
stroyed many international cartels through the elimination of the participation of American 
firms, in many cases the leading members of their respective industries. It is doubtful that 
major international cartels can effectively control world markets in the face of competition 
and noncooperation from American industry. BERGE, CARTELS: CHALLENGE To A FREE 
WoRLD 18 (1944). 
50 Criticism will undoubtedly be made that the Report does not provide "do and 
don't" solutions to each specific problem. This quest for certainty, desirable as it may be, 
is unfortunately not the destiny of man under the antitrust laws or any other laws. See 
Levi, "An Introduction to Legal Reasoning," 15 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 501 (1948). 
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provisions are not needed. We can continue on a case-by-case basis, 
recognizing that within the Rule of Reason there is sufficient flexibility 
for maintaining strict enforcement consonant with the special prob-
lems and difficulties besetting foreign trade today. We can enforce 
the act but with due regard for the rights and liabilities imposed by the 
laws of other countries. 
As ~ means for providing expert and competent enlightenment on 
difficult national problems, and as an aid to Congress in resolving diffi-
cult and sometimes technical public issues, the Attorney General has 
provided a procedure which should be used more often. It is a method 
for approaching difficult problems that is truly in the democratic tradi-
tion. Even if the conclusions produce further controversy and dis-
cussion, it can only be helpful to have had this careful, exhaustive 
study of an important public issue by this group of outstanding pro-
fessionals. 
